It’s an odd word. “Door,” in Finnish, Ovi has been the vision of Nokia for nearly a decade. A door to mobile connectivity, Ovi was conceived as a portal to a suite of connected services designed to significantly enhance and vastly improve the capabilities of mobile devices. Yet the realization of this vision is still just outside the grasp of the world’s largest mobile device manufacturer.
Achieving this much maligned vision, however, is critical for Nokia, especially if they truly intend to compete in the North American smartphone market as they’ve indicated time and time again.
For years, the mobile experience was focused on the device alone; its capabilities, specifications, network and it’s syncing to an individual computer. Networks were not designed for large data demands and the mobile web was insignificant, under-developed and largely ignored. (remember .mobi sites?) However, it’s no longer enough to offer the greatest specs including the highest megapixel camera or fastest processor or largest screen. Device specs are only as good as how well the services and functionality is integrated. There will always be a newer device with improved specs, but an effective suite of services?
As the leader in the mobile industry, Nokia recognized over a decade ago that a critical paradigm shift was about to occur, from devices to services, and began to slowly maneuver towards a transition from solely a device manufacturer to a mobile internet service provider. This was foreign territory for them, as they had, and continued to, foster partnerships with burgeoning and existing consumer entities to provide integrated services. Slowly the acquisitions began with an apparent vision for providing a unique integrated suite of services for users of Nokia handhelds.
In order to understand how this has evolved, it’s important to look at some of the more notable services Nokia acquired along the way, as well as how they have shaped Nokia/Ovi services and in light of other suites of mobile services available. This is specifically ignoring the list of network and hardware acquisitions Nokia made in order to provide a specific look at the evolution of Ovi services and growing through acquisition. It is not comprehensive, instead focusing on the major decision points and critical moments in the evolution of mobile services.
A Sorted (or Sordid) history of Mobile Services
Back in 2003, Nokia acquired Eizel Technologies, which provided solutions for “server-based products that transform email messages, attachments, intranet applications and web content into formats easily accessible by any mobile device on any network.” Nokia also reached an agreement with Sega.com Inc, obviously to enhance and improve the N-Gage mobile gaming service Nokia provided.
Jumping ahead through hardware and networking add-ons, 2006 brought the acquisition of Intellisync Corporation which gave Nokia the ability to compete directly with RIM for enterprise business mobility solutions, and disengage the support of the blackberry Connect solution. Nokia also purchased Loudeye Corp, which at the time was a leader in digital music distribution services. (Ultimately, Intellisync for Business was de-supported and is the technology behind Nokia Messaging.)
2007 was a huge year, for both Nokia alone as well as for the mobile industry as a whole. While it wasn’t recognized by all at the time, the launch of the iPhone, and its direct integration with the iTunes ecosystem of content delivery and consumption would change the manner in which mobile devices were used, perceived and ultimately consumer expectations for mobile services. Because Apple was building on its established set of services that had already solidified dominance in the entertainment industry for content delivery, there was an inherent advantage in the services arena. Apple was able to provide not only a smooth custom and simple OS that was consumer friendly, but to expand its services to consumers in a way that seemed to provide easier access and a more simple mobile experience. Google, which already had a successful history of developing mobile applications and services, announced the Open Handset Alliance and the Android Operating system in November of that year, and the race for integrated mobile internet based services was now in full gear.
Meanwhile, Nokia purchased Twango, which was ultimately rebranded Share on Ovi, Enpocket, for mobile marketing and entertainment, and Avvenu, providing mobile access to desktop/laptop based files which was ultimately rebranded Files on Ovi. They announced the launch of Ovi as both a portal to mobile services and a connection to desktop synchronization and connectivity. It appeared at that time that Ovi was beginning to take some shape in a variety of offerings that could establish Nokia as a mobile internet services provider, IF they were able to effectively and efficiently integrate these services.
Therein lies one of the core problems. With new entrants into the mobile landscape, Nokia now had competition in the mobile services that they had never had before. Apple’s iTunes control and Google’s mobile services provided each of these companies with an angle into the mobile arena that Nokia couldn’t compete with, yet, or so it seemed.
But Nokia continued to pursue a vision of services through its largest, and most successful, acquisition of Navteq which has continued to evolve as Ovi Maps in 2008. Coupled with Oz Communications, it became apparent that Nokia was envisioning services for the entire mobile landscape, from low end devices to smartphones. This noble vision, however, has been more challenging to execute as the consumer device market changed, and user expectations, especially in North America, began to focus on the ease of integrated services.
No Small Task
Since that time, a lifetime in mobile, so much has changed. In addition to other acquisitions designed mostly to bolster Ovi Maps, Nokia has launched new desktop software branded as Ovi Suite, as well as the Ovi site designed to bring the suite of services together. Unfortunately for Nokia, while they’ve struggled to find effective integration of acquired software, both Google and Android have built upon their previously available ecosystems to expand their seamlessly integrated software offerings. For instance, Apple launched the App store, prompting every device manufacturer, and carrier (and anyone else who thought they could make a buck) to create their own mobile application store. Ovi Store is no exception. Google added free navigation to Google maps, and Nokia responded by changing Ovi Maps to be free for Nokia devices.
Time and time again, Nokia has tried to respond to the well received moves of competing platforms, but time and time again, they have been out maneuvered, either because they are competing against companies that began their mobile efforts from the standpoint of online ecosystems rather than the standpoint of mobile device manufacturers, or because of a lack of dedicated resources and commitment to advance the Ovi Vision.
In order to make waves in the North American mobile market, the services game will be a critical play for Nokia, and yet it appears as though there is still a mixed vision for what Ovi is and will be. The North American market alone is no easy nut to crack, and to try to accomplish success there while maintaining global leadership is even more daunting.
What is critical, however, is the need for a consistent vision, and a dedication to that vision, rather than wavering through million dollar acquisitions and then abandoning them for any number of reasons.
At its peak of offerings, Ovi included the following:
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- Share
- Maps
- Sync (Contacts, Mail and Calendar)
- IM
- Files
- Music (only in certain locations)
- N-Gage
- Store
Unfortunately, undermining the complete Ovi vision, Nokia has eliminated N-Gage, and has announced the closing of Ovi Files. Development on Share is seemingly non-existent and Music is only available in certain markets. Some have said that this is a good thing for Nokia, and that lighter and more efficient is better for them long term, and I understand, but don’t agree with this. Yes, it’s an uphill battle. Yes, it’s technically challenging. Many problems still exist, and fixes are seemingly less likely as they abandon some of their acquired IP and services. A quick look at the major issues…
- Single Sign On – Put simply, this needs to work, and if a user selects “remember me,” it should in fact, remember them.
- Device integration – Chanse Arrington presented this vision for Ovi integration a while back that would help this, but much like iTunes and Android provide immediate synchronization with Apple and Google services, this would provide a means of bringing consumers directly into the suite and offering a more seamless experience. (When I requested permission from Chanse to post this, he indicated that a version of this vision has been incorporated into the forthcoming N8, which is good news.)
- Update and Improvements – Share, in particular, has been stagnant for years. While contacts and email have improved slightly, there are significant opportunities for enhancements and improvements that have been shelved or ignored in light of the hardware wars. This is and has been a mistake. Also, Ovi Suite needs to be improved and offered across platforms.
- Market Segregation – As an example, and unfortunately for Nokia, North American carriers and many media conglomerates will not cow tow to the mobile giant’s demands, and as a result services like Music are simply not offered in North America markets.
Some of these issues are due to legacy systems. Others are the result of strategy changes. The lack of resources, and the commitment to the offerings, however, has been the greatest hurdle for Ovi and its components, and ultimately this has driven many users away from the suite.
What can be done?
Without getting into the technical issues of converging systems from multiple acquisitions and the IP associated with it, let’s consider for amoment the possibilities of a dedicated effort to effectively integrate the Ovi Suite offerings listed above, addressing the issues above. The possibilities are endless. Here is a small selection of ideas I had when imagining how could/should Ovi be improved in order to provide a unique experience for the mobile user and differentiate form other platforms:

- Improve Share and integrate with other services, such as Maps, Contacts, even Files to allow for users to remotely share location, multimedia or documents from their desktops with their contact groups, publicly etc.
- Turn Files into an integrated Dropbox type solution, free for Nokia users.
- Build more social components into Maps/Contacts/Contacts/Mail/IM (@EverythingBlaxx and @IamNii_Teiko have suggested Ovi Connect, which I happen to like) as well as with Ovi Store
- Integrate Nokia Beta Labs into the Ovi Suite Store. There shouldn’t be as many places to find software for your device. Third party systems should not be eliminated, however if Nokia is building something for Nokia devices, they should use Nokia delivery methods to offer them!
- Utilize the (acquired via Trolltech) Qt technology to provide these systems across devices and platforms. MeeGo, S^3/4 for mobile apps and Win 7, OS X and Linux for the desktop suite. If Nokia is truly committed to maintaining their position as leader in mobile, then they need to fix Ovi. Fixing Ovi requires a commitment across device category and across platforms. It requires a coordinated effort to effectively integrate all of the systems, and bring all development branches together.
If Nokia does this, they can provide a platform that offers not only an alternative to major competitors, but also differentiates them by providing more integrated offerings that advance how mobile devices are used, as well as how easy it is to adopt these services.
Nokia has the critical business partnerships, the Intellectual property and a wealth of resources, both human and fiscal to support providing a platform that is neither a closed garden, nor a cover for advertising. Otherwise, they’ve wasted countless amounts of money on acquisitions, run the risk of becoming the former leader in mobile internationally, and staying an also-ran in North America.
Nokia’s “door” for deep market penetration is still open in North America, as hints of push back to Apple’s highly controlled “walled garden,” and Google’s invasiveness, advertising driven, data-mining ecosystems begin to percolate. Nokia needs to remain focused on the consumer as their primary client, and in doing so they can leverage this as distinctly different from both Apple, who’s primary clients are the entertainment giants and the developers making money through applications, and Google, who’s primary clients are advertisers. Nokia needs to BE Ovi. If Nokia can fix it’s door to integrated mobile services, Ovi, then they can offer a solution that is innovative and effective, and provides opportunity and privacy for the consumer.
I hope we hear more about Ovi development and vision at Nokia World 2010, but am afraid the focus will remain on trying to beat device specs rather than delivering a fully featured and integrated suite of services.
*Photo in edited N8 image courtesy of The Wandering Angel.
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